DPRK IT Workers

I’ve been digging into this ‘DPRK IT Worker’ threat, and we’re not just fighting fake resumes anymore; we’re fighting an adversary who has a U.S.-based accomplice making their overseas activity look like it’s coming from the USA rather than North Korea/China/Russia.

So, how do we catch them?

For me, it starts at the endpoint. I’m pushing my team to tune our EDR to hunt for legit remote access tools that just… shouldn’t be there. Think AnyDesk, ScreenConnect, or weird IP-KVM drivers on a standard build. We’re even looking for “mouse jigglers”!

On the network, “impossible travel” alerts are a classic for a reason. You can’t be on our VPN from a U.S. home IP and logging into O365 from Eastern Europe five minutes later.

I’m also a big fan of UEBA for spotting weird behaviors. Is your “U.S.” employee suddenly working a perfect 3 AM to 11 AM shift every single day? That’s a huge red flag they’re in a completely different time zone.

But honestly, the one control I’d bet on? Hardware-based MFA. I’m talking YubiKeys or other FIDO2 tokens. A facilitator in the U.S. can’t tap a physical key for an operative overseas. It’s a simple, physical roadblock that just stops this whole scheme cold.

#Cybersecurity #NorthKoria #DPRK #ITWorkerScheme #InsiderThreat #RemoteWork #ZeroTrust #SecurityControls #InfoSec